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Abstract
According to the prospect theory and the loss-aversion 
function, this paper developers the buyback contract 
model in a two-stage supply chain with a loss-averse 
supplier and multiple loss-averse retailers. Under the 
stockout loss setting, we analyze the effect of the loss 
aversion on the behavior from the retailers and the 
supplier, and then the buyback contract has been shown 
to be able to coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, 
the number of retailers and loss aversion coefficient meet 
a certain range, there will be a unique optimal buyback 
price to achieve supply chain coordination.
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INTRODUCTION
As the market competition intensifies gradually, with 
the progress of science and technology ,more and more 
product life cycle shortens constantly, the perishable 
goods have become an important research subject in 
supply chain field. For its unstable demand and the 
short sales cycle, the risk preference of supply chain 
participants plays an important role in the supply chain 
decision. However, most researchers usually assume 
that the participants are risk neutral, in other words, in 
accordance with the expected utility theory, its decision-
making goal is expected to maximize profits. Faced 
with the risk in the stochastic market, the participants’ 
decisions would be different, in turn, it would affect the 
supply chain performance. Therefore, the risk preference 
becomes an important factor for supply chain .
In recent years, scholars begin to study the risk 
preference of the supply chain participants. Choi, Li, 
and Yan (2008) measure the risk aversion with the MV 
model which is developed by Markowitz (1952), under 
the supply chain with a retailer and a manufacturer. In 
the background of the supply chain composed by a single 
supplier and a single retailer, Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and 
Schlesinger (1995) and Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) 
predict the expected returns and risk for the risk aversion 
newsboy with the expected utility function. Jacobson and 
Roszbach (2003) study the relationship among the bank 
loan, the credit and the risk by the VR method. Chen, Xu 
and Zhang (2009) and Yang, Xu and Yu (2009) analyze the 
risk aversion with CVaR method. Although these studies 
made up for the inadequacy of expected utility, they could 
not explain some behavior of policymakers, prospect 
theory put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is 
good enough to describe and explain the decision-making 
behavior the supply chain members ,which overthrew the 
“rational man” assumption in traditional economics, and it 
argues that: (a) most people is risk aversion in the face of 
the gain; (b) most people seek risk when facing loss; (c) 
people are more sensitive to loss than gain. (d) decision-
makers are loss averse. The size of the loss produces pain 
to the decision-maker is more than happy for the same 
size of revenue. That is to say, decision-maker is bounded 
rationality in the decision, and different decision-makers 
will make different response to the uncertainty. Hence, 
prospect theory makes a more comprehensive explanation 
why participants evade the risk but sometimes will not. 
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Researchers generally study prospect theory from 
the newsboy model. Daniel and Amos (1979) discuss 
the participants’ decision when risk emerges. Schweitzer 
and Cachon (2000) find that under a known demand 
distribution, the loss-averse newsboy’ order is always 
lower than that in the expected utility. Wang and 
Webster (2009) conclude that loss-aversion plays a 
restricted role in the goods quantity by studying loss-
averse newsboy. Wang (2010) studies the game among 
the multiple loss aversion newsboys, according to the 
proportion distribution requirements principle, proves 
that the influence of the loss- aversion is so strong that 
the total inventory in the competition will be less than the 
inventory in integrated supply chain.
Its purpose is how to coordinate the supply chain 
participants and achieve the optimal supply chain 
system, after analyzing the loss-aversion influence, 
some scholars achieved the coordination by the supply 
chain contracts, which include wholesale price contract, 
buyback contract, revenue sharing contract and quantity 
flexibility contract, etc.. The buyback contract is of great 
practical value in the supply chain contract coordination 
mechanism, It can not only share the risks of the market 
uncertainty, also motivate retailers to increase the order 
quantity. Pasternack (1985) is the first researcher to put 
forward the concept of the buyback contract, points out 
that the partial buyback strategy (the buyback price is 
the wholesale price) can make the supply chain system 
to realize the coordination. Howard (1995) and Mantrala 
and Raman (1999) show that the buyback contract 
mechanism can encourage retailers to increase product 
quantity, to improve the interests of the whole supply 
chain, but different buyback price has different effect 
on the manufacturer. Cachon (2003) realizes that under 
the certain condition, the buyback contract distributes 
the channel profit arbitrarily between suppliers and 
retailers,. As the retailer’s sales efforts have an impact on 
the demand, Taylor (2001) combines a proper objective 
feedback strategy with buyback contract to achieve win-
win result. He (2005) also gets this conclusion with the 
newsboy Xu et al. (2008) design the restrictive buy-back 
contract which also coordinates the supply chain, and has 
a practical significance to verify the sale effort level. Lau 
et al. (2001) develop the principal - agent and buyback 
contract model to solve the supply chain coordination in 
the asymmetric cost information. Refer to Lau et al., Cao 
(2012) takes the emergency situation into consideration to 
study the buyback contract, the optimal buyback strategy 
also emerges.
From the above, the relevant contract documents for 
the loss-aversion are not in consideration of one-to-many 
supply chain under stockout loss situation. This paper will 
consider the coordination between multiple loss-averse 
retailers and a loss-averse supplier in the supply chain. 
With the prospect theory, we will analyze the retailer’s 
ordering behavior and decision-making behavior and 
the influence of buyback contract to supply chain, under 
stockout loss situation. This paper is organized as follows: 
We will formulate the model and propose assumption 
in section 2; the section 3 will analyze the integrated 
supply chain; the retailers and supplier’s decision will be 
presented in section 4; we will investigate the buyback 
contract coordination mechanism in section 5; the section6 
shows the summary.
1. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
To facilitate the model and theoretical analysis, we 
assume that multiple loss-averse retailers selling the same 
type of the newsboy product, the product information 
is completely open in the open market. Faced with the 
stochastic market demand, each loss-averse retailer will 
forecast the market need before the sales period, and order 
products to the supplier. For meeting requirements of the 
total order quantity, supplier provides products to each 
retailer respectively. As sales period is over, supplier buys 
the rest of products back.
The retail price is exogenously given and denoted by 
p. The supplier produces the product at a unit cost c, and 
sells the product to the retailer at a unit wholesale price w. 
Let qsc be the order quantity of the retailer in the integrated 
supply chain, q be the total quantity of retailers in the 
decentralized supply chain , the retailer i orders qi, so we 
get q-i=q-qi. In addition, we use b\* MERGEFORMAas 
the buyback price. s is the unit stockout cost ; In this 
two-echelon supply chain, demand is random and all 
unsatisfied demands are lost at the end of the season. 
Denote by x the market demand with PDF f(x), and 
CDF F(x) is defined to be differentiable, invertible, and 
strictly. that is F(0)=0, and F
_
(
 
x
_
)
 
=1-F(x). Let G(xi) be the 
i retailer’s stochastic demand distribution function, g(xi): 
the first one retailer’s density function .
We also assume that:
For the retailer i, the market demand is proportional to 
its order quantity, that is,  i i
x q
x q
= , so we get that function:
 i ix q
x q
= ,  i ix q
x q
=  . (1)
(b) Gain (or loss) is perceived if the final wealth is 
higher (or lower) than the initial wealth, at the end of the 
selling season. We define the loss-aversion utility function 
of the retailer to be piecewise linear as follows
 
 0 , 0ir ir ir  ∏ −∏ ∏ ≥
 ( )irU Π =
 ( )0 ,ir ir ir irλ ∏ −∏ ∏ < 0{ . (2)
Where λir is defined as the retailer’s loss-aversion 
level and Π0ir is the final wealth of the retailer after the 
selling season. If λ=1, then the retailer is risk neutral. If 
λ>1, then a slope change occurs at the reference level, 
and the higher value of λ implies the higher level of loss 
aversion, in order to simplify the model, let denote each 
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retailer’s loss aversion coefficient is the same, that is, 
λir=λ. Without loss of generality, we normalize Π
0
ir=0, if 
Π0ir≥0, then retailer perceive the gain, at that time, Πir<0, 
retailers perceive the loss. As well as the supplier, and the 
supplier’s loss aversion is λs.
(c)To avoid unrealistic and trivial cases, we assume 
that the following relationship is maintained: p>w>c.
2. INTEGRATED SUPPLY CHAIN 
In integrated supply chain, retailers and supplier belong 
to an entirety system, the loss reference has no effect on 
the total supply chain, and we need not consider the loss 
aversion. The supplier’s output is the total retailers’ Sales. 
So, expected gross profit of the integrated supply chain is 
as follows:
 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
scq
SC sc scE p v q F x dx c v q
 
∏ = − − − −  
 
∫ . (3)
A f t e r  t a k i n g  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  t h e  e x p e c t e d 
u t i l i t y  ( 3 )  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  q  y i e l d s ,  w e  g e t 
 [ ]( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )SC sc
sc
E
p v F q c v
q
∂ ∏
= − − − −
∂
. W e  f i n d  t h a t 
expect supply chain profit function is concave function 
in qsc. Hence, the optimal production quantity q
*
sc should 
satisfy  * 1( )sc
p cq F
p v
− −=
−
.
3. DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN
In the decentralized decision-making mode, suppliers and 
retailers are independent and limited rational individual. 
In the trade process, they will attempt to maximize 
their own interests as the goal. In this case, suppliers 
and retailers is a master-slave relationship, there is the 
Nash equilibrium problem among retailers, it is that the 
retailers and supplier both pursue their expected utility 
maximization.
3.1 The Retailers’ Decision
According to the wholesale price and the buyback price 
offered by supplier, coupled with stockout loss, retailers 
make their own sale price, order and profit.
  ir∏ =
 ( ) ,i i i i i ipx wq b q x x q− + − ≤
 ( )( ) ,i i i ip w q s x q x q− − − ≥
{ . (4)
I f  Π i r= 0 ,  t h e  r e t a i l e r ’s  s u r p l u s  b a l a n c e  i s 
 
1(q )i i
w bx q
p b
−
=
−
 
2 (q )i i
p w sx q
s
− +
=
, 
 
1(q )i i
w bx q
p b
−
=
−
 
2 (q )i i
p w sx q
s
− +
= , thus we can know that 
xi<x1, then Πir<0; x1<xi<qi, then Πir>0; qi < xi < x2, then 
Πir>0; x2 < xi, then Πir<0. Mapping the retailer’s expected 
profit function into the Its utility function (2), we can get 
the retailer’s expected utility profit is:
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
2
2
0
( ( ))
( ) ( )
i
i
qx
ir i i i i i i i i i i i i
x
x
i i i i i i i i i i i i
q x
E U px wq b q x g x dx px wq b q x g x dx
pq wq s x q g x dx pq wq s x q g x dx
λ
λ
∞
∏ = − + − + − + −      
+ − − − + − − −      
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ .
Put the Formula (1) into the retailer’s expected utility function, and  1(q) ( )i i
w bx q q
p b −
−
= +
−
 
2 (q) ( )i i
p w sx q q
s −
− +
= +
,
 
1(q) ( )i i
w bx q q
p b −
−
= +
−
 
2 (q) ( )i i
p w sx q q
s −
− +
= + , 
q=qi+q-i, so we will simplify the E[U(Πir)].
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
(q) (q)
0 (q) (q)
( ( ))
x xq
i i i i
ir
x q x
p b q p b q sq sq
E U F x dx F x dx F x dx F x dx
q q q q
λ
λ
∞− −
∏ = − − + +∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ . (5)
Taking the first derivative and second derivative, then we get:
  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
2
(q)
2 2
0 (q)
(q)
42
( 1)
( 1)( )
( ) ( )
x q
ir i i i
i x
x
i i i i
q
E U p b q p b q q w bF x dx F x dx F q
q q p bq q
q sq p w s q sq
p b s F q F x dx F x
q q qq
λ λ
λ λ
− −
−
∂ ∏  − −  −  = − − − −  ∂ − 
− − +
− − + + + +
∫ ∫
∫ ,
 (6)
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1
2 (q) (q)
12 3 2 2
0 (q)
2
2 1 1 22 2
2
2 2 2 1 (q)
1
+ 2 (q) (q) (q)
x xq
ir i i i
i x q
i
i i
E U q q q
p b F x dx p b F x dx s F x dx F x w b
q q q q
p w sq
p b s F q f q f x x q f x q f x
sq q
λ λ
λ
− −
−
−
 ∂ ∏     = − − + − − − − − +   ∂    
 − − +
− − + + − +    
  
∫ ∫ ∫
.
 (7)
For p>b, λ≥1, then  
( )2
2 0
ir
i
E U
q
∂ ∏   <
∂
, that is E(U(Πir))is 
concave function in qi, hence, the n-1 retailers’ order is q-i, 
there is a unique optimal order q*iu strategy for the retailer 
to obtain the optimal value to make Formula (6) to be 
zero. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1
1
2
(q) * *
12 2
0 (q)
(q) * *
22
( 1) ( ) ( )
( 1)( )
=0
x q
i i iU iU
x
x
i iU iU
q
p b q p b q q q
F x dx F x dx F x q p b s F q
q qq q
sq p w s q sq
F x dx F x q
q qq
λ λ
λ λ
− −
−
− −
− − − − − − +
− − +
+ + +
∫ ∫
∫ .
 (8)
Theorem 1: For n retailers, the Nash equilibrium exists and q*1U=q*2U…=q*iU…=q*nU, the optimal the retailers ‘total 
order q*r meets:
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
* *1
*
1
*
2
*
*
* * *
1* *
0
* *
*
*
(n 1) (n 1) 1( 1)q ( ) ( )
1 ( 1)( ) 0
r r
r
r
r
x q q
r
r r r
r r x q
x q
r r
r
r q
p b p b qnF x dx F x dx F x q p b s F q
nq nq n n
s n p w s q sqF x dx F q
nq n n
λ λ
λ λ
− − − − −
− − − − − − +
− − − +
+ + + =
∫ ∫
∫
 (9)
Proof: This article assumes retailers to be plyers who 
have to participate in a game, in a particular case, if none 
of the players can act alone to increase their earnings, then 
the formation of the decision-making combination of the 
retailers produces Nash equilibrium. According to Nash 
equilibrium existence theorem (Lee & Zhou, 2013): “In a 
dividual strategy type game, if each player’s pure strategy 
space Si is a non-empty, closed on Euclidean space, the 
bounded payment function is continuous and to be quasi-
concave, then the pure strategy’s Nash equilibrium exists 
in this game. “and when retailers order goods from the 
supplier, their game strategies and the corresponding 
payment function space satisfy the pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium condition .
For any retailer’s optimal order quantity can be 
represented by the Formula (8) and retailers make the 
decision simultaneously. According to the symmetry, the 
Nash equilibrium exists, then there must be q*1U=q
*
2U…
=q*iU…=q
*
nU，that is 
 * *1
iU rq qn
= , q*-iU=(n-1)q
*
iU, and formula 
(9) is tenable.
Theorem 2: q*r is an increasing function in s, is 
decreasing function in λ and w.
 ( ) ( ) ( )
*
2
** *(q ) * *
2 22
( 1) ( )q ( 1)( )(p w)(q ) (q )r
xi r i ir r
r rq
q q p w qdq p w s qF x dx F x f x
ds q q q q
λ λ
λ− −
− + − − − + −
= + + +∫
 ( ) ( ) ( )
*
2
** *(q ) * *
2 22
( 1) ( )q ( 1)( )(p w)(q ) (q )r
xi r i ir r
r rq
q q p w qdq p w s qF x dx F x f x
ds q q q q
λ λ
λ− −
− + − − − + −
= + + +∫ . (10)
*
0i
dq (w)
ds
> , that is: When stockout loss is gradually 
increasing, the retailer will stimulate increasing order 
to reduce losses for stockout. Similarly,  
*
0r
q
λ
∂
<
∂
 * 0rq
w
∂
<
∂
, loss 
aversion and wholesale prices increase, retailers will make 
the movement to reduce the order quantity.
Theorem 3: For each retailer, there is a unique 
optimal unit stockout loss, so that the retailers can 
obtain the maximum expected utility in s=s*, that is 
E[U(Πir(s
*))]=E[U(Πir(q
*
i))].
P r o o f :  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
4 42 2 4
( ) ( )( 1) ( 1) 0ir i i
E U p w q p w qF x f x
s s s
λ λ
∂ ∏  − −  = − − − − <
∂
 ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
4 42 2 4
( ) ( )( 1) ( 1) 0ir i i
E U p w q p w qF x f x
s s s
λ λ
∂ ∏  − −  = − − − − <
∂
, according to Theorem 2,
*
0i
dq (w)
ds
> , 
for  ( )
2
*2 0
ir
i
E U
q
∂ ∏   >
∂
, numerical corresponding relation 
shows, if s=s*, then qi=q*i.
3.2 The Supplier’s Decision 
As a dominant, supplier decides on the wholesale price 
and the buyback price, but the supplier’s profit will be 
affected by the retailer’s order quantity.
  s∏ =
 ( ) *rw b c q bx x q− − + ≤，
 ( ) * *,r rw c q x q− ≥
{ . (11)
If w≥b+c, then Π s>0, if w<b+c, then Π s≤0, the 
supplier’s breakeven point is xs, in order to fully reflect 
the characteristics of loss aversion suppliers, we assume 
w<b+c, thus *=s r
w b cx q
b
− −
− , the supplier’ expected utility 
function is as follows:
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
*
* *
0
( ( ))
s r
s r
x q
s S r r
x q
E U w b c q bx f x dx w b c q bx f x dx w c f x dxλ
∞
   ∏ = − − + + − − + + −   ∫ ∫ ∫
  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
*
* *
0
( ( ))
s r
s r
x q
s S r r
x q
E U w b c q bx f x dx w b c q bx f x dx w c f x dxλ
∞
   ∏ = − − + + − − + + −   ∫ ∫ ∫ .
 (12)
After taking the first partial derivative of (12), with 
respect to w, we get:
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
*1s s rs r
E U F x qF q w c
w b w
λ
∂ ∏    ∂  = − − + − ∂ ∂ 
.
E[U(Πs)] is a concave function in w, so the optimal 
wholesale *w should satisfy the following :
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
*1 0s rs r
F x qF q w c
b w
λ
  ∂
− − + − =  ∂ 
. (13)
Theorem 4: The larger the retailers ’loss-aversion 
degree becomes, the larger the buyback price given 
by supplier turns; the smaller the buyback price given 
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by supplier is, the smaller the buyback price become.
Proof：for p>w>b and λ ≥ 1, we get as following with 
the implicit function rule:
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )
0
0
1 1
/
0
/
q
ir
w b qir p b
w bF x dx p b w p qf q
E U b p bb
E U
p b F x dx
λ λ
λ λ −−
 −
+ + − − −  ∂ ∂  −∂   = − = − >
∂ ∂ ∂  
− −
∫
∫
in the same way,  0
s
b
λ
∂
<
∂
.
Theorem 4 describes that when retailers are loss 
averse, the supplier’ buyback price should increases 
along with the increase of loss aversion coefficient, 
and irrelevant with shortage cost, and the degree of 
loss aversion of supplier will affect their buyback price 
decisions. So, supplier as leader, on the one hand should 
consider the loss of retailer’ preferences, on the other hand 
prefer to try to minimize his loss aversion and formulate 
buyback price in rational attitude which will be beneficial 
to the whole supply chain coordination.
4. SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION 
MECHANISM BASED ON BUYBACK 
CONTRACT
As retailers and supplier are each a separate entity, they 
will maximize their own interests in the supply chain 
transaction, which will cause the supply chain to perform 
worse, compared to integrated supply chain, and therefore, 
the supplier should adjust buyback price to inspire and 
guide retailers to order quantity which is equal to the order 
quantity of integrated supply chain.
Theorem 5: In the supply chain system with the loss-
averse supplier and multiple loss-averse retailers in the 
buyback contract, there is only buyback price to make the 
whole supply chain system to achieve coordination.
Proof: For Formula (9) and Formula (13), we can 
gain the critical loss aversion coefficient of the retailers 
and supplier λt, λs and the critical number of the retailers 
nt.
 ( )
( )
*
1
r
s
s
F q w c b
F x
λ
 − + = +
 
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
** 2
**
1
*
1
* * *
1 2
( )
* *
2 1
0
1 1
1
rr
rr
r
x qq
r r r
qx q
t x q
r r
p b n F x dx s n F x dx w b F x q p w s F x q p b s F q
p b n F x dx p w s F x q w b F x q
λ
− − − − − − + − + + − +
=
− − − + − + − −
∫ ∫
∫
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
** * 21
**
1
* * * * *
1 2
( )
0
1
1
rr r
rr
r r r r r
x qx q q
qx q
q w b F x q p w s F x q q p b s F q
n
sp b F x dx F x dx F x dx
p b
λ
λ
 − − − − + + − + = +
 
 − − − +
 −
 
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,
.
,
For, E[U(Π ir)] is known to be strictly increasing 
function in b. if b=w, then T(q*r)>0; if λ>λt and n<nt, 
then b=p-s, T(q*r)<0. So, b∈(p-s,w)exists and meets 
q*r=q
*
sc. By reverse extrapolation to solve b
*, put q*r=q
*
sc 
into the Equation (9), we can get the optimal buyback 
price:
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
2
*
( )
* * * * * * *
1
* * *
2
1 1 1 ( 1)
( )
( 1) 1
sc
sc
x q
sc sc sc sc sc sc sc
q
sc sc sc
n q F x q sq F q s n F x dx p w s q F q sq
b w
q F q n F x q
λ λ λ
λ
− − + − − + − − + −
=
− − −
∫  .
b(w) are substituted into the Eqution (12), and 
 ( ) 0s
E U
w
∂ ∏   =
∂
, we can solve w*, b*, in b*∈(p-s,w).
Theorem 5 shows coordinate the decentralized supply 
chain, the degree of loss aversion of retailers must be 
greater than the critical point, and their number is less 
than the critical point, the supply chain will be possible 
to achieve coordination, and the buyback price is bigger 
than the stockout loss, at the same time. From the profit 
perspective, supplier should control the buyback price 
within the proper limits, so such the supplier can not only 
effectively motivate retailers, but also make the supply 
chain to achieve the coordination.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a two-stage supply chain system as a 
background, under the stockout loss situation, we discuss 
the effect of loss aversion on the behavior of decision 
makers and the role of buyback contract coordination, so 
we get results as follows:
 (a) There is the optimal stockout loss to make utility 
maximized and to get the optimal order quantity.
 (b) In the uncertain and competitive market, Nash 
equilibrium can be achieved among the multiple loss 
averse retailers.
 (c) Further study shows that order of retailers will 
increase in pace with the increase of buyback price, while 
26Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
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supplier is more loss averse, the buyback price is lower, 
which also shows the suppliers should try to reduce the 
effect of loss aversion preferences in the transaction process, 
but also concerns the retailer’s loss aversion preferences, 
so as to achieve more satisfactory results, making the 
whole supply chain system to achieve coordination.
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